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ABSTRACT
During the last several decades, interdisciplinary research centers have emerged as a
standard, powerful tool for federal funding of university research. This paper contends
that this organizational model can be traced to the ‘‘Interdisciplinary Laboratories’’
program funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1960. The novelty of
the IDL program was that it created a peer group of university laboratories with
sustained funding to ensure their institutional stability. The Cornell Materials Science
Center, one of the first three Interdisciplinary Laboratories, served as a breeding
ground for a new community of engineering faculty members, who subsequently
helped establish a series of interdisciplinary research centers at Cornell, including the
National Research and Resource Facility for Submicron Structures (or National
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Submicron Facility) in 1977. The Materials Science Center and National Submicron
Facility provided explicit models for the expansion and coordination of networks of
interdisciplinary centers, both within single universities (such as Cornell) and across
multiple campuses (through programs such as the National Nanotechnology Infra-
structure Network and the Nanoscale Science and Engineering Centers). The center
model has proved both flexible and durable in the face of changing demands on
universities. By examining the Materials Science Center and the National Submicron
Facility, we show that recent institutional developments perceived as entirely novel
have their roots in the high Cold War years.
KEY WORDS: materials bottleneck, relevant research, multidisciplinarity, microfabrication,
organizational field, laboratory buildings
On January 21, 2000, President Bill Clinton announced the National Nano-
technology Initiative (NNI). Clinton and, later, George W. Bush justified the
NNI not only for its scientific merit, but also for its potential to fend off
foreign competition and secure American industrial competitiveness in the
emerging field of nanotechnology.1 For American universities, the initiative
meant a large influx of federal funds to conduct research on and train advanced
students in nanoscale science and technology. The NNI’s most visible tool in
aiding academic nanoscientists has been the interdisciplinary university
research center: as of July, 2012, the NNI’s website lists fifty-four dedicated
university nano centers funded by its member agencies, plus another six
‘‘networks’’ of smaller centers and seventeen National Science Foundation
(NSF)–funded academic centers that are partially nano-oriented. Indeed, most
of the NNI’s centers and networks were funded by the NSF, primarily through
its Nanoscale Science and Engineering Centers (NSECs), Materials Research
Science and Engineering Centers (MRSECs), and the National Nanotechnol-
ogy Infrastructure Network (NNIN).
While the fifteen NSECs, thirty-five MRSECs, and fourteen NNIN sites
cover a broad range of research interests—from nanomanufacturing to nano/
bio interfaces and environmental nanotechnology—they share some common
institutional features. Most importantly, their operating procedure follows, in
1. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘President Clinton’s Address to Caltech on
Science and Technology,’’ California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA (21 Jan 2000). For
an analysis of the policy battles that led to the NNI, see Yasuyuki Motoyama, Richard Appel-
baum, and Rachel Parker, ‘‘The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Federal Support for Science
and Technology, or Hidden Industrial Policy?’’ Technology in Society 33 (2011): 109–18.
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NSF parlance, the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support.’’2 According to the NNI’s
official website, these centers ‘‘provide opportunities and support for multi-
disciplinary research among investigators from a variety of disciplines and from
different research sectors, including academia, industry and government
laboratories.’’3 Multiyear contracts ensure some continuity in funding, con-
tributing to the centers’ relative financial stability. Finally, while the NSECs,
MRSECs, and NNIN sites are required to identify several ‘‘thrust areas’’ or
central research themes, the authority to fund individual researchers or pur-
chase specific tools is largely delegated to the executive committees at host
universities. In short, interdisciplinarity, stability, and decentralization are the
key characteristics of NSF-funded university research centers.
In this paper, we contend that the historical origin of the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of
support’’ can be traced to the late 1950s, when the newly created Advanced
Projects Research Agency (ARPA) began a funding program to support inter-
disciplinary materials research in response to the Sputnik crisis in 1957. We do
not mean, of course, that ARPA invented organized interdisciplinary research.
Industrial research laboratories have relied on avowedly interdisciplinary teams
since at least the early twentieth century, while the Rockefeller Foundation
funded several interdisciplinary academic research units in the 1930s.4 During
World War II, academic scientists and engineers mobilized in interdisciplinary
laboratories to develop new weapons systems, such as MIT’s Instrumentation
and Radiation Laboratories, the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory,
and the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory.5
The novelty of the ARPA materials research program, however, was that it
created a peer group of university laboratories dedicated to fostering a specific
field and providing sustained funding to ensure their institutional stability.
2. Dragana Brzakovic, ‘‘NSF Centers: Platforms for Innovation,’’ http://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/
presentations/db/platforms_for_innovation.pdf (accessed 4 Dec 2011), on 5. Brzakovic’s pre-
sentation succinctly covers the characteristics of this mode of support.
3. National Nanotechnology Initiative, ‘‘Centers and Networks,’’ http://nano.gov/centers-
networks (accessed 19 Jul 2012).
4. Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE
and Bell, 1876–1926 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robert E. Kohler, Partners in
Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900–1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991).
5. David Kaiser, ‘‘Elephant on the Charles: Postwar Growing Pains,’’ in Kaiser, ed., Becoming
MIT: Moments of Decision (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 103–21; Michael Aaron Dennis,
‘‘‘Our First Line of Defense’: Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American State,’’ Isis 85,
no. 3 (1994): 427–55.
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The result was the creation of a community in the field of materials science
with a common institutional experience. The successful emergence of a disci-
pline of materials science in the 1960s, with the ARPA centers as its institu-
tional backbone, heightened the status of interdisciplinary centers as a modus
operandi of federal funding for academic science and engineering in subsequent
decades. Since the early 1970s, federal research funding agencies have almost
automatically reacted to changes in national science policy priorities by foster-
ing new peer groups of interdisciplinary academic research centers. The NNI’s
heavy reliance on peer groups of interdisciplinary academic centers is merely
the latest example of this organizational form’s continuous significance for
more than fifty years.
The case of Cornell University provides a particularly useful example for
illuminating the continuity and adaptability of the centers mode in the postwar
era. Cornell was one of three universities—along with the University of
Pennsylvania and Northwestern University—selected by ARPA in 1960 to
establish the first batch of Interdisciplinary Laboratories (IDL) in materials
science. The Cornell Materials Science Center (MSC), as the largest and
most successful among its peers, was not only a wellspring of advanced
knowledge and trained personnel, but also became an institutional exemplar
for future interdisciplinary centers both within and outside Cornell
University.
Nationally, the success of the MSC in the 1960s and the simultaneous
formation of an interdisciplinary materials science community contributed
to the survival of the centers mode despite contracting defense budgets in the
early 1970s, when the ARPA program was transferred to the NSF. Locally, the
MSC served as a critical resource in the establishment of other interdisciplinary
centers at Cornell, particularly the National Research and Resource Facility for
Submicron Structures (NRRFSS) in 1977.
The NRRFSS and other second-generation Cornell centers should be seen
as products of the community of physical scientists and engineers who came of
age within the MSC. The NRRFSS and other Cornell centers were also linked
as peers with centers at other universities that were similarly closely tied to their
campus’s materials science centers. Together, Cornell’s MSC and NRRFSS
and their inter- and intra-university peers provided explicit models for the
expansion of the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support’’ at NSF, up to and including the
NSEC and NNIN programs today.
The postwar trajectory of the Cornell physical sciences community reflects
the broad sociopolitical changes that transformed the American scientific
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landscape. Yet Cornell’s centers have, at least superficially, been remarkably
stable amid those changes. Established institutional structures can be adapted
to a broad range of rationales, depending on the specific needs of the time. At
Cornell and elsewhere, institutions created in the high Cold War era to con-
duct basic research and train specialists in materials science were later adapted
to serve the ‘‘relevance’’ agenda of the late 1960s and early ’70s. Since the late
1970s, those same institutions (and their spin-offs) have served as models for
successive crops of research institutions created to meet international economic
competition. Through the years, the interdisciplinary center model has shown
both persistence and flexibility.
We emphasize the continuity of institutional models for scientific research
as both an addition and a corrective to recent scholarship on discontinuities in
the role of research universities in the United States during the last half-
century. Many scholars have noted that ‘‘Cold War universities’’ dramatically
reoriented toward commercial activities around 1980, sometimes characterizing
the latter mode as ‘‘postmodernity.’’6 In this narrative, new ‘‘interdisciplines,’’
such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, emerged as key denizens of the
commercialized universities.7 The commercialized postmodern university did
not, however, arrive fully formed in the 1980s. Rather, it was built using
existing institutional resources that had been in place since at least the late
1950s. In this paper, we aim to eschew the dichotomy of pre- and post-1980,
and underscore the continuities of scientific research communities and institu-
tions in the postwar decades. The case of Cornell University clearly shows that
recent institutional developments perceived as entirely novel have their roots in
the high Cold War years.
6. Paul Forman, ‘‘The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity,
and of Ideology in the History of Technology,’’ History and Technology 23 (2007): 1–152. Forman
is not the only one that takes circa 1980 as the key turning point. Roger Geiger also points to 1980
as the point when ‘‘concerted effort was made to relate academic research more closely to the
civilian economy.’’ Roger L. Geiger, Knowledge & Money: Research Universities and the Paradox of
the Marketplace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), vii. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
is another reference point in the discussion over the commercialization of research universities.
On the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act, see David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N.
Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis, Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: University-Industry
Technology Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2004).
7. Some sociologists formulate this as a change from ‘‘Mode 1’’ to ‘‘Mode 2’’ research. See
Michael Gibbons et al., The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research
in Contemporary Societies (London: Sage, 1994).
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‘ ‘MATERIALS BOTTLENECK’’
At the end of World War II, scientists and policymakers began to recognize the
problem of procuring adequate strategic ‘‘materials’’ as critical for the rapidly
expanding national security apparatus. For example, John von Neumann,
eminent mathematician and commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), frequently expressed frustration at the unavailability of key materials
for nuclear reactors.8 Newly developed weapons systems, such as long-distance
ballistic missiles, jet aircrafts, and advanced electronics equipment, often
required novel materials with superior properties. By the mid-1950s, the term
‘‘materials bottleneck’’ came into wide circulation within the Washington
science policy circle to describe the lack of knowledge and personnel in
materials research.
The recognition of the ‘‘materials bottleneck’’ was partly based on a critical
reflection on materials research practices during World War II and the early
postwar years. As MIT professor Arthur R. von Hippel quipped in 1956, ‘‘[t]he
answers to the increasingly excessive demands for materials remain empirical;
they are slow in coming and are bought in uncertain approaches at an excessive
cost.’’ In other words, materials research had been plagued by what he called
a ‘‘phenomenological approach.’’ As a solution to this problem, von Hippel
proposed an alternative approach of ‘‘molecular engineering’’ based on the firm
theoretical foundation of the molecular properties of matter. Utilizing the vast
advances in physics and chemistry during the last fifty years, he continued, one
could ‘‘build materials from their atoms and molecules for the purpose at
hand . . . . He can play chess with elementary particles according to their
prescribed rules until engineering solutions become apparent.’’9
While the potential power of fundamental physical principles was widely
acknowledged among scientists in the 1950s, not everyone accepted it as a rem-
edy for the materials bottleneck. Solid-state physicist Frederick Seitz, for
example, expressed more humility as he pointed out that the ‘‘present methods
of theoretical analyses are far too crude to give us more than a rough grasp of
the properties of even the simplest material systems.’’ A more realistic solution
could be found, he argued, in the ‘‘symbiotic activity of several species of
8. See, for example. Frederick Seitz, ‘‘Perspectives in Materials Research,’’ Physics Today 14,
no. 11 (1961): 24–28.
9. A. von Hippel, ‘‘Molecular Engineering,’’ Science 123 (1956): 315–17. For a more compre-
hensive articulation of Von Hippel’s vision, see his edited volume Molecular Science and Molecular
Engineering (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1959).
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scientist and engineer . . . . The future development of the field [materials
science] requires that means be found to enhance the interplay of various
professional groups.’’10 As opposed to Von Hippel’s rather grandiose vision
proffering primacy to scientific principles, Seitz called for a cooperative effort
among physicists, chemists, and engineers. Seitz’s vision gradually emerged as
the dominant view among policymakers as federal efforts to foster materials
research came to fruition in the late 1950s.
The critical impetus for a large-scale program on materials research came
from the external shock of Sputnik in October 1957, which sparked widespread
concerns that the Soviet scientific and technological capabilities were rapidly
outstripping those of the United States. Within this context, the field of
materials science quickly became one of the key theaters of the Cold War.
As early as January 1958, officials at the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
and the AEC had already begun detailed discussions on the scale and scope of
the new materials program. By early 1959, the newly created Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was accepting preliminary proposals from
major research universities around the country as part of its IDL program.11
The program’s name reflected its underlying aim to foster interdisciplinary
cooperation and collaboration among related disciplines of physics, chemistry,
and metallurgy (among others). This goal was to be achieved through making
available centralized spaces and shared facilities on campus, within which
scientists and engineers could mingle and interact.
In July 1960, ARPA completed the review process and announced the results
of the first-year contracts. From more than three dozen applicants, the agency
selected Cornell University ($6.1 million), the University of Pennsylvania
($4.4 million), and Northwestern University ($3.4 million), each for an initial
period of four years and renewable with a four-year forward plan.12 Nine more
contracts of various sizes were awarded within the next three years, making
a total of twelve IDLs around the country. The IDL program continued until
1972, when it was transferred to the NSF and changed its name to the Materials
Research Laboratories (MRL) program.
10. Seitz, ‘‘Perspectives’’ (ref. 8).
11. Robert L. Sproull, ‘‘Materials Research Laboratories: The Early Years,’’ in Peter A. Psaras
and H. Dale Langford, eds., Advancing Materials Research (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1987), 25–34.
12. ‘‘U.S. Aids Research in New Materials,’’ New York Times, 17 Jul 1960; Cornell University
News Bureau, ‘‘Press Release,’’ 1 Jul 1960, DRC, Box 3, Folder 5.
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PHYSICS AND ENGINEERING COMMUNITIES AT
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Cornell University was the largest beneficiary of the ARPA-IDL program
throughout its twelve years of existence. Who, then, were the people behind
Cornell’s proposal? In the 1950s, Cornell boasted a vibrant and prestigious
physics community on campus. This was made possible in large part by the
arrival of Hans A. Bethe in 1935.13 Trained under Arnold Sommerfeld and
Enrico Fermi, Bethe was a theoretical physicist with a broad range of interests
in nuclear and solid-state physics. During the war, he was recruited by
J. Robert Oppenheimer to lead the theoretical physics division of the Los
Alamos Laboratory and made critical contributions to the basic design of the
first atomic bomb. When Bethe and the other Cornell physics ‘‘veterans’’
returned to campus after the war, they were greeted with much fanfare. As
Bethe noted later, ‘‘[r]eturning ‘veterans’ could make ambitious plans, [and
the university] administration [was] very receptive. Government support was
very likely.’’14 Armed with university and government support, the physics
community aimed to continue their wartime research on nuclear physics at
the new Laboratory for Nuclear Studies, established in 1946 complete with
an electron synchrotron built with funding from the Office of Naval
Research.15 Between 1945 and 1952, the size of the physics faculty grew by
more than 40%—from 17 to 24—attracted by the high-profile faculty mem-
bers and the new research facility.16 The Cornell physicists had a head start in
pursuing an active research agenda in atomic and nuclear physics during the
early postwar years.
The expansion of the Cornell physics community soon crossed the bound-
aries of the College of Arts and Sciences, of which the Department of Physics
was a part. In 1948, Lloyd P. Smith, then chairman of the physics department,
13. Lillian Hoddeson, Ernst Braun, Jurgen Teichmann, and Spencer Weart, eds., Out of the
Crystal Maze: Chapters from the History of Solid State Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 193.
14. H. A. Bethe, ‘‘30 Years of Physics at Cornell,’’ speech given at the Clark Hall Dedication,
20 Oct 1965, Hans Bethe papers, #14-22-976, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections,
Cornell University Library, Box 8, Folder 63.
15. S. S. Schweber, ‘‘Big Science in Context: Cornell and MIT,’’ in Peter Galison and Bruce
Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1992), 177–79.
16. Number counted from appendix of Paul Hartman, The Cornell Physics Department: Re-
collections and History of Sorts (privately published in 1984), 332–40.
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successfully wrangled a deal with the university administration to establish the
new Department of Engineering Physics within the College of Engineering.
This was in return for Smith’s turning down a deputy directorship of RCA’s
Laboratories Division at Princeton, the premier industrial research organiza-
tion of its time with which Smith had collaborated extensively. The objective
of the new department was to provide ‘‘training which is neither entirely that
of the physicist nor that of the engineer’’—in other words, to ‘‘break down the
traditional barriers that had divided the province of science and engineering.’’17
By 1959, physicists in the two departments worked side by side within the
Laboratory for Atomic and Solid State Physics (LASSP) housed within the
university’s Rockefeller Hall, a half-century-old structure built in 1906 with
a quarter-million dollar gift from John D. Rockefeller.18
With the exception of the Department of Engineering Physics, the other
engineering departments at Cornell were still largely populated with faculty
members with a strong bias toward teaching and service, those sometimes
disparagingly referred to as ‘‘old school’’ engineers or ‘‘cookbook materials
types.’’19 When Dale Corson moved from chair of the physics department
to dean of engineering with a mission to transform the college from being
‘‘craft-centered’’ to ‘‘science-centered,’’ the composition of engineering faculty
members soon emerged as a critical bottleneck. Corson noted, for instance,
that at Cornell materials science seminars in the early 1960s, ‘‘even with worth-
while outside speakers . . . there was no participation or show of interest by the
[engineering] faculty—they simply sat at the back of the room, mute.’’20 The
generational and disciplinary bifurcation of faculty members continued to pose
a serious problem through the early 1960s. As late as 1964, Corson openly
expressed his discontent toward the ‘‘old school’’ engineers: ‘‘There are con-
centrations of staff not oriented toward research or intimate with the frontiers
of engineering in science. A cursory look at the present effort shows that
a number of our engineering divisions . . . do little research and make small
contribution to the advancement of the field.’’21
17. Paul L. Hartman, Applied and Engineering Physics at Cornell: A History of the School with
Various Asides and a Brief Look at the Department from Which It Came (Ithaca, NY: College of
Engineering, Cornell University, 1994), 8–9.
18. J. A. Krumhansl, ‘‘The Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics,’’ 12 Jan 1961, DRC,
Box 16, Folder 18.
19. Hartman, Engineering Physics (ref. 17), 37–38.
20. Ibid., 38.
21. ‘‘Cornell and Its Future in Engineering,’’ 8 Oct 1964, DRC, Box 16, Folder 28.
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Given the asymmetry in research activities between the physics and
engineering communities, it was no surprise that the former took the lead
when ARPA began to solicit proposals for the IDL program in early 1959. At
the helm was Corson (then still chairman of physics), who assembled the
‘‘Interdepartmental Committee on Materials Research Program.’’ He named
Henri S. Sack, professor of engineering physics, as chair of the committee with
the responsibility of coordinating the effort to prepare the proposal. Other
members of the committee included physicist Robert L. Sproull and two
young assistant professors from the College of Engineering, Arthur L. Ruoff
and Chester W. Spencer.22 As chair, Sack played an instrumental role in drafting
the proposal, and between May 1959 and April 1960 he prepared four documents
outlining a detailed plan for the new Materials Science Center (MSC).23
Sack recognized that the key area of weakness for Cornell was the imbalance
of research activities between physics and engineering. This was a serious
problem for a center whose aim was to foster interdisciplinary collaboration
among scientists and engineers. In the proposal, Sack managed to spin the
weakness in the best possible light: ‘‘In Metallurgical Engineering and Engi-
neering Materials, research has been relatively inactive until a few years ago;
but a strong upsurge is taking place and the research efforts are being increased
at a rapid rate.’’24 Sack’s remark was probably more hopeful thinking than an
accurate representation of reality. In terms of the annual operating budget at
the time of writing the proposal, the Department of Physics alone occupied
52% ($385,000) of the total research activities in materials science at Cornell,
while the three engineering departments of Metallurgical Engineering, Engi-
neering Materials, and Chemical Engineering combined held a meager 14%
($108,000). If Engineering Physics was included as part of the physics com-
munity, the unevenness became even more conspicuous.25 Thus, building up
a strong research community in engineering to match their physicist colleagues
emerged as an urgent matter.
22. T. P Wright (Vice President Research) to Dale R. Corson, 11 May 1959, CCMR, Box 36,
Folder 11; Arthur L. Ruoff, interview with author (Choi), Ithaca, NY, 15 Jun 2009.
23. Sproull became the inaugural director of Cornell’s Materials Science Center, a post he
assumed until 1963 when he became the Director of ARPA. Sack succeeded Sproull as the second
director of MSC. The first draft of the proposal was entitled ‘‘Plans for a Materials Science Center
at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.,’’ 23 May 1959, DRC, Box 3, Folder 3.
24. ‘‘Plans for Materials Center’’ (ref. 23), 5.
25. ‘‘Additional Remarks to ‘Plans for a Materials Science Center at Cornell University’
submitted May 23, 1959,’’ 23 Sep 1959, CCMR, Box 31, Folder 31.
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Despite the potential weakness of the Cornell team’s proposal, the ARPA-
IDL contract was awarded to the university in July 1960. Efforts to secure the
contract were largely led by physics members of the Departments of Physics
and Engineering Physics, where the bulk of research activities in materials
science were taking place. In the proposal, Sack outlined Cornell’s research
activities in materials science, including transport phenomena, electronic prop-
erties, surface structure, magnetic spin resonance, high polymers, and metal
physics. The first four topics represented work done largely by physicists; high
polymers was the chemists’ domain; and metal physics that of the engineers.
Apart from Ruoff and Spencer, who respectively worked on diffusion and
creep under high pressure and electronic properties of intermetallic com-
pounds, there was little intercollegiate overlap of research areas.26 It was emi-
nently clear that the success of Cornell MSC as an IDL would depend upon
cultivating a new community of research-oriented engineers and embracing
them as equal partners in the endeavor.
‘ ‘ IMPACT OF THE ARPA PROGRAM’’
In July 1960, the Cornell Materials Science Center officially began its opera-
tion, with Robert Sproull as inaugural director.27 With the establishment of
the MSC, materials research practices at Cornell University underwent slow
but significant change. Henri Sack and Paul J. Leurgans (associate director of
MSC) noted in a 1964 report outlining the ‘‘Impact of the ARPA Program in
the Area of Materials Science’’ in its first five years that ‘‘it is not too early to feel
already the marked impact of the Center [MSC] on graduate education and
research at Cornell in general, and the area of materials in particular.’’ In their
view, the most visible changes were staff expansion and construction of a new
building dedicated to the physical sciences, which was to be occupied in the
following year.28
As Cornell University added new faculty members in the materials area,
special attention was placed on fostering a research-oriented engineering com-
munity. This, at the most fundamental level, required a generational shift:
26. ‘‘Plans for Materials Center’’ (ref. 23), 5–11.
27. Cornell University News Bureau, ‘‘Press Release,’’ 24 Jul 1960, DRC, Box 3, Folder 5.
28. Henri S. Sack and Paul J. Leurgans, ‘‘Impact of the ARPA Program in the Area of Ma-
terials Science at Cornell University: The First Three Years of Operation of the Materials Science
Center,’’ 31 Jan 1964, CCMR, Box 14, Folder 23.
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rather than encouraging skill-based traditionalist engineering educators to
build up their research agenda, administrators brought in a new breed of
engineers with experience in science-based research and training. One of the
earliest of these young Turks in Cornell’s College of Engineering was Arthur L.
Ruoff. He was hired in 1955 as assistant professor in the Department of
Engineering Mechanics and Materials, upon earning his doctorate in physics
and physical chemistry at the University of Utah under the direction of Henry
B. Eyring.29 In addition to serving on the committee that prepared the IDL
proposal, Ruoff played a leading role in developing a new materials science and
engineering curriculum to replace the obsolete coursework in metallurgical
engineering.30 He was followed by a few other isolated cases in the Department
of Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering, such as Chester W. Spencer (Ph.D.,
University of Wisconsin, 1952) and Herbert H. Johnson (Ph.D., Case Institute
of Technology, 1957).31 These young engineering professors were at the core of
the Cornell College of Engineering’s early participation in the MSC.
Thus, though a few young, research-oriented engineering faculty were hired
in the second half of the 1950s, the influx of new funding from the ARPA
contract gave a much needed boost to that trend. MSC leadership went to
great lengths to promote expansion in the engineering disciplines, sometimes
at the expense of the sciences. In 1962, at an MSC Executive Committee
meeting called to discuss ‘‘long-range plans,’’ director Sproull recommended
that ‘‘expansion for the next few years should occur mostly in [John P.] Howe’s
area [Engineering Physics and Materials Science] and EE [Electrical Engineer-
ing], with very little in Chemistry and Physics.’’32 Within a decade, more than
a dozen engineering faculty members working in the field of materials science
were hired in various departments with partial funding from the MSC pro-
gram. As we will see below, some of the young engineering faculty members
brought in during the early years of the MSC—such as Joseph M. Ballantyne
(Electrical Engineering) and Boris W. Batterman (Materials Science and
29. Eyring was an eminent chemist who contributed to the study of chemical reaction rates.
He was a faculty member at Princeton University until 1946, when he moved to the University of
Utah as dean of its graduate school. His relocation to Utah was partly motivated by his religious
faith as a Mormon. For Eyring’s ‘‘life and faith,’’ see Henry J. Eyring, Mormon Scientist: The Life
and Faith of Henry Eyring (Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Books, 2008).
30. Arthur Louis Ruoff, ‘‘Personal Data,’’ copy provided to Choi by Ruoff.
31. Ruoff, interview (ref. 22).
32. ‘‘Memo for the File: Meeting of the MSC Executive Committee on 26 September, 1962,’’
15 Oct 1962, CCMR, Box 20, Folder 2.
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Engineering)—went on to play important roles in building further interdisci-
plinary centers spun off from Cornell’s MSC.33
The other landmark change facilitated by the ARPA award was the con-
struction of a new building dedicated to the physical sciences. If the Cornell
physics community was at the front line pushing hard for the ARPA-IDL
contract, at least part of their motivation came from the possibility of fulfilling
their decades-long wish for an expanded space adequate for cutting-edge
research. As Sproull repeatedly acknowledged, ‘‘A good part of the grass roots
impetus for this materials program . . . arose from the feeling that the Physics
and Engineering Physics groups would simply have to help themselves if they
were going to emancipate themselves from the impossible conditions in Rock-
efeller [Hall].’’34 The postwar expansion of the Cornell physics community led
to extremely cramped quarters within Rockefeller Hall. Moreover, the half-
century-old structure lacked the adequate infrastructure required for physics
research. Therefore, heated discussions on the size and location of a new
building ensued soon after ARPA announced the first three winners of the
IDL contract.
From the beginning, Sproull was determined to build a ‘‘first-class research
building.’’ As early as September 1960, he made plans to visit laboratory
buildings around the country. In his mind, the best models were recently built
industrial and government laboratory buildings, such as the Union Carbide
Parma Laboratory near Cleveland, Ohio; the IBM Research Center in York-
town Heights, New York; the new Bell Telephone Laboratories in Holmdel,
New Jersey; and the AEC Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Upon inspect-
ing these state-of-the-art research facilities, Sproull strongly favored the ‘‘utility
corridor’’ system to allow for maximum flexibility in providing services such as
water, special gases, and power.35 Also, the new building would be ‘‘completed
air-conditioned,’’ using chilled water from the nearby Beebe Lake.36 Architects
33. Joseph M. Ballantyne, an MIT doctorate with specialties in semiconductor materials, was
hired as assistant professor of electrical engineering in 1964. He played an instrumental role in
establishing Cornell’s National Research and Resource Facility for Submicron Structures
(NRRFSS) in 1977. Boris W. Batterman, also an MIT doctorate in physics, arrived at Cornell in
1965 after years of experience at the Bell Telephone Laboratories, and became the key figure
behind the Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source (CHESS) established in 1978.
34. Robert L. Sproull, ‘‘Early History of the MSC at Cornell,’’ Aug 1963, CCMR, Box 31,
Folder 4.
35. Robert L. Sproull, ‘‘Physical Sciences Building History,’’ 1964, CCMR, Box 31, Folder 31.
36. John E. Gerich, ‘‘Science Center . . . Univ. Constructs Largest Hall,’’ Cornell Daily Sun, 3
Jan 1963.
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at J. Fruchtbaum of Buffalo, New York, came up with a building design
exhibiting a towering seven-story structure in the shape of an ‘‘iceberg,’’ with
a broad base and narrower upper floors. This was intended to house most of
the sensitive experimental instruments on the ground floor, so as to minimize
vibration. Sproull even took care to divert undergraduate traffic away from the
laboratory areas, in order to ‘‘keep the pounding of feet when classes were
changed quarantined into a region of the building that did not include research
labs.’’37
After a few months debating details, Cornell administrators and faculty
members decided to make the new ‘‘Physics-ARPA Building’’ the largest struc-
ture on campus, with approximately twice the square footage covered by the
ARPA contract. The new building would be occupied by the departments of
Physics, Engineering Physics, and Astronomy; the LASSP; the Center for
Radiophysics and Space Research (CRSR); a common physical sciences library;
and the MSC administrative offices and part of its shared facilities. Approxi-
mately $4 million—half of the construction cost—came from ARPA. The rest
was covered by the NSF, the New York State Dormitory Authority, and
FIG. 1. The Clark Hall of Science, ca. 1965. Source: Reprinted from Paul L. Hartman, Cornell’s
Materials Science Center: The Early Years (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Center for Materials Research,
2007), 76. Permission granted by Cornell Center for Materials Research.
37. Ibid., 15.
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a $3 million gift from Cornell alumnus W. Van Alan Clark, chairman emeritus
of Avon Products, Inc.38 The building, named the Clark Hall of Science in
honor of the donor, was finally dedicated on October 20, 1965. At the dedi-
cation ceremony, Hans Bethe appropriately gave his blessings with an overview
of ‘‘30 Years of Physics at Cornell,’’ summarizing his experiences at the uni-
versity since 1935.39
Despite all the rhetoric of interdisciplinary research, Clark Hall was meant
to be home mainly to the physics community. The location of Clark Hall at
the center of the campus, strategically connecting Rockefeller Hall (Physics
and Engineering Physics) and the Baker Laboratory of Chemistry, symbolized
the ‘‘new spirit of cooperation among the physical sciences.’’40 Towering over
campus from atop a low-rising hill, the façade of Clark Hall had interesting
parallels to the Greek Parthenon. Indeed, the new building was to be a mod-
ern-day temple for the physical sciences. From the Engineering Quad, where
most of the engineering departments were located, however, it is a rather long
and uphill walk to Clark Hall. The distance was definitely not prohibitive, but
certainly could have been a factor discouraging more intimate interactions
between scientists and engineers.41 While the geographical marginalization
of the engineering community from the MSC headquarters at Clark Hall
should not be equated with marginalization in research funds and facilities,
it nevertheless reflected the unspoken power relations between the physics and
engineering communities in the 1960s.
By the mid-1960s, the Materials Science Center was well on its way to
becoming a prominent feature of Cornell’s campus. It had succeeded in its
stated aim of convincing departments in the College of Engineering to hire
a number of new faculty members from top Ph.D. programs around the
country, and it had put ARPA money into supporting research done by those
new hires. The impressive state-of-the-art laboratory building located right
across the street from the main library served as a visible symbol of the
38. ‘‘The Physics-ARPA Building,’’ 22 Aug 1960, CCMR, Box 4, Folder 10; ‘‘Dedication of
Clark Hall of Science and Physical Sciences Symposium,’’ 20 Oct 1965, Hans A. Bethe papers,
#14-22-976, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Box 8,
Folder 63.
39. Bethe, ‘‘30 Years’’ (ref. 14).
40. ‘‘Clark Hall of Science,’’ 2 Dec 1966, CCMR, Box 4, Folder 10.
41. In a recent interview, Arthur Ruoff emphasized the distance between his department and
the MSC headquarters, and added that whenever one walks between Clark Hall and the Engi-
neering Quad ‘‘[i]t’s probably raining, in addition.’’ Ruoff, interview (ref. 22).
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heightened status of materials research at Cornell. MSC members produced
important research results in their respective fields, as well as an increasing
number of graduate students who went on to do similar research at other
FIG. 2. Campus Map of Cornell University, February 2013. Clark Hall was built in the space
adjoining Rockefeller Hall (physics) and Baker Lab (chemistry). Note the location of the
Engineering Quad toward the southern end of campus, surrounded by Carpenter, Thurston, and
Phillips Halls. Source: Cornell Campus Planning Office. Printed with permission of the Cornell
Campus Planning Office.
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universities and in industry.42 From Cornell’s perspective, things were moving
along smoothly.
THE SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE
Progress was noticeably slower, however, in meeting the ARPA-IDL program’s
original goal: a solution to the materials bottleneck. As early as April 1964,
program officers at ARPA were concerned that IDLs were not yielding enough
results directly applicable to the immediate defense needs of the nation. That
month, Charles F. Yost, Director for Materials Sciences at ARPA, transmitted
a memorandum to the IDL directors outlining a plan to solve the ‘‘problem of
translation of materials sciences to technology.’’ The opening paragraph of the
memo clearly conveyed Yost’s concerns: ‘‘Although the DOD expends
millions of dollars annually in effective support of new materials science and
in the development of technological solutions to the materials requirements in
the new systems hardware, there continues to exist a ‘materials bottleneck’
constituting a serious obstacle to the national goals of adequate defense.’’43
As a solution, Yost proposed an ‘‘organizational and management mecha-
nism’’ called ‘‘coupling,’’ designed to forge links among universities, industry,
and government laboratories. While the IDLs ‘‘expanded basic research and are
producing new generations of trained people,’’ these outputs were not quite
enough from DOD’s perspective. The dual objectives of the coupling program
were ‘‘1. The exploitation of fundamental materials sciences in order to evolve
new materials technology; 2. The orientation of such an exploitation toward
Department of Defense needs in materials.’’44
ARPA’s attempt to harness fundamental science for military applications
was part of a broader science policy discussion in Washington. Already in 1963,
42. Out of twenty-four PhDs who graduated through Cornell MSC in 1965, eleven of them
went on to academic positions, six to industrial jobs, and four to government laboratories. ‘‘Grad-
uate Students Who Have Received Advanced Degrees, 1964–1965,’’ CCMR, Box 38, Folder 20.
43. Charles F. Yost to Directors, Materials Sciences Program, IDL Universities, 23 Apr 1964;
ARPA Materials Sciences, ‘‘Translation of Materials Sciences to Technology: The Problem and
a Possible Solution,’’ 7 Apr 1964, CCMR, Box 1, Folder ARPA Correspondence, Jul 63–Jun 64.
44. ‘‘Translation of Materials Sciences’’ (ref. 43), 3. Perhaps reflecting the general response of
the academic community, the reader of the memorandum made handwritten notes in the
margins, putting a question mark next to the phrase ‘‘Department of Defense needs’’ and noting
that this was ‘‘too restricted.’’ The person who wrote the note was most likely Henri Sack, who
was the Director of Cornell MSC at the time.
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the DOD had begun a project to evaluate the effectiveness of its research and
development contracts in attaining new weapons systems. The result of the
evaluation was dismal. According to the project’s final report, basic science con-
tributed a meager 0.3% in developing the air-to-ground tactical missile system.45
In the latter 1960s, DOD’s pressure on universities to prove relevance
mounted considerably. In early 1967, for example, the Office of the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E) sent a memo to the
Director of ARPA, entitled ‘‘High Priority Problems in the DOD Materials
Programs.’’46 The memo outlined the most urgent materials needs for the
defense establishment and derived the technological limitations as well as the
basic research required to meet them. The items listed under ‘‘Priority A’’ were
deep submergence, low cycle fatigue, sonar and anti-sonar, thermal protection,
and armor. In the area of deep submergence, for example, the memo observed
that existing materials, such as high-strength steel and titanium alloy, were
inadequate for operations below 15,000 feet under water. Hence, the DOD
called for ‘‘improvements in reinforced plastics,’’ which required extensive basic
research in polymer chemistry, amorphous surfaces, and glass-resin interactions.
While the memo did not directly mobilize scientists for mission-oriented R&D,
it was certainly meant to discipline the IDLs—as participating materials scien-
tists understood loud and clear. As MSC Director Henri Sack reported upon
returning from an IDL Directors’ Meeting in Washington in early 1968, ARPA’s
emphasis was on ‘‘‘relevance’ to ARPA as a user (and DOD in a wider sense).’’47
The background for ARPA’s search for relevance was the gradually decreas-
ing federal budget for research and development beginning in the second half
of the 1960s.48 Then, in 1969 came the Military Procurement Authorization
Act, drafted by Senator Mike Mansfield. Later known as the Mansfield
Amendment, the act banned the use of DOD budget to fund ‘‘any research
or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to
a specific military function or operation.’’ For the IDLs, this decision only
45. For an early discussion of Project Hindsight, see Karl Kreilkamp, ‘‘Hindsight and the Real
World of Science Policy,’’ Science Studies 1 (1971): 43–66.
46. Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to Director, Advanced
Projects Research Agency, ‘‘High Priority Problems in the DOD Materials Programs,’’ 6 Feb
1967, CCMR, Box 20, Folder 8.
47. H. S. Sack to Members of Executive Committee, ‘‘IDL Directors’ Meeting, Washington,
D.C. January 5, 1968,’’ CCMR, Box 20, Folder 8.
48. See, for example, George C. Wilson, ‘‘War Trims U.S. Aid to Research,’’ Washington Post,
27 Nov 1967.
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reinforced the trend that had already been in place since the mid-1960s. In
early 1970, Robert Huggins, on leave from Stanford University to serve as
Program Officer at ARPA, sent an urgent telegram to all IDL Directors re-
questing a ‘‘short statement on the relevance of each work unit to a specific
military function or operation.’’ These statements were to be used by the
Director of ARPA to prepare ‘‘an adequate defense to any part of the DOD
program that might be single [sic] out for attack.’’ Huggins added that the
‘‘guiding principle’’ for the relevance statements should be that ‘‘length and
depth must be proportional to presumed vulnerability.’’49
By the fall of that year, DOD could no longer justify continuation of the
ARPA-IDL program. In 1971, Congress decided to transfer the IDL program
wholesale to the NSF under a new rubric: the ‘‘Materials Research Laboratories
(MRL)’’ program. This decision greatly relieved the IDL universities, which
had feared the program would simply be wiped out. During the transition
period, the NSF conducted an extensive assessment of all IDLs to ensure the
program’s feasibility. While the review process was largely uneventful (none of
the existing centers was axed), one question baffled the NSF reviewers: did the
IDL program achieve its initial goal of fostering interdisciplinary research? As
one of the reviewers openly admitted, the notion of interdisciplinarity ‘‘de-
pends largely on the individual interpretation of the meaning of the same
words as used by different people. The problem is akin to that of an American
and a Russian discussing democracy.’’ But, he continued, the review team
reached a ‘‘general consensus . . . that the extent of the interdisciplinarity re-
sulting directly from the IDL experiment has been, at most, modest.’’50 What
could have been the criteria that they used to reach this conclusion?
Within the NSF in the early 1970s, the notion of interdisciplinary research
was tied inextricably—indeed, by official definition—to the issue of relevance.
According to an official study of the first couple of years of the NSF-MRL
program, research conducted by collaborating practitioners from multiple
academic disciplines did not, by itself, qualify as ‘‘interdisciplinary research.’’
Rather, the defining characteristic of interdisciplinary research was that the
49. Robert Huggins, ‘‘Memo to Principal Investigators of all ARPA-supported Materials
Research Programs; Implementation of Section 203 of the 1970 Military Procurement Authori-
zation Act,’’ 8 Jan 1970, Materials Research Lab Records, 1949–1996, Special Collection Library,
Pennsylvania State University Archives, University Park, PA, Box 2, Folder ARPA Crystal Prep.
Program at Penn State.
50. ‘‘Materials Research Laboratories: Where to in Materials Research,’’ n.d. [1971?], CCMR,
Box 5, Folder 5.
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‘‘problem determines the selection of the personnel required, whereas in other
[non-interdisciplinary] research the individual’s discipline determines his
problem selection.’’51 That is, the NSF, like many science policy stakeholders
in the Vietnam era, viewed interdisciplinary research as nearly equivalent to
‘‘problem-oriented’’ or ‘‘relevant’’ research.52 In the eyes of the NSF’s
reviewers, the IDLs lacked interdisciplinarity not because their members did
not come from multiple disciplines, but because materials research activities
at the IDLs were not oriented to solving problems. Hence, NSF program
officers—just like their predecessors in the ARPA program—continued to
push academic materials scientists to produce more practical solutions.
A CENTER OR A FACILITY?
Thus, the NSF moved to exert its influence over the MRLs’ research agenda
almost as soon as the program was transferred from ARPA. In return, the
MRLs reshaped the NSF by enhancing the status of engineering science and
of the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support’’ within an organization traditionally devoted
to supporting individual basic researchers in the physical and life sciences.
Those shifts, in turn, facilitated the NSF’s accommodation to the legislative
and executive branches’ increasing desire for applied, interdisciplinary research
‘‘relevant’’ to civilian ‘‘human problems’’ such as environmental remediation,
mass transit, public housing, and biomedicine.53 The intertwining of the
51. Management and Cost Analysis Staff, GCO, ‘‘Materials Research Laboratories Study,
January 1974,’’ Office of the Historian: Agency Organizational History and Selected Back-
grounds, Records of the NSF, Record Group 307, National Archives and Records Administration
II, College Park, MD, Box 20, Folder Materials Research Lab. (73-74).
52. For multiple examples of administrators, faculty members, and student protestors at
Stanford equating interdisciplinarity and relevance in the early 1970s, see Cyrus C. M. Mody,
‘‘Conversions: Sound and Sight, Military and Civilian,’’ in Trevor Pinch and Karin Bijsterveld,
eds., Oxford Handbook of Sound Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 224–48 and
Cyrus C. M. Mody and Andrew J. Nelson, ‘‘‘A Towering Virtue of Necessity’: Computer Music
at Vietnam-Era Stanford,’’ Osiris 28 (forthcoming).
53. Works that survey the turn toward civilian ‘‘relevance’’ include: Eric J. Vettel, Biotech: The
Countercultural Origins of an Industry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006);
Juan C. Lucena, Defending the Nation: Policymaking to Create Scientists and Engineers from
Sputnik to the ‘War Against Terrorism’ (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005); Jen-
nifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and
American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993).
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center model and the desire for applied (or engineering) research with civilian
relevance was forcefully accelerated in 1970 when the Nixon administration
made a deal with the NSF to grow its total budget by $100 million (the NSF
had only asked for a $13 million increase).54 About half of that budgetary
expansion was due to the MRLs and other programs shifted to the NSF
because of the Mansfield Amendment. Most of the rest was targeted to new
programs in civilian, applied research.
The NSF’s budgetary inflation and new emphasis on applied research in
turn reinforced the growing influence within the Foundation of academic
engineering scientists. By 1970, slightly more doctorates were being awarded
in the United States each year in engineering than in the physical sciences (and,
of course, many more master’s degrees), despite a downturn in engineering
employment. Indeed, these academic engineering scientists were precisely the
type fostered by the ARPA-IDLs in the 1960s. Leaders of the NSF’s Engineer-
ing Division were eager to capitalize on that growing constituency. Thus, in
1974, the sixteen engineering program officers were each told to propose
a marquee project55 that would place the Engineering Division in the same
rank as the Materials Research Division (with its new stable of MRLs) and
other units (such as the Office of Polar Programs) that controlled one or more
large centers or facilities.
But what sort of facility would be most likely to succeed in the NSF of the
mid-1970s? Declining overall research budgets, Congressional pressure to
spread the wealth over a larger geographical area, and a widespread belief that
research equipment was becoming prohibitively expensive combined to create
incentives to fund a facility that (unlike the original MRLs) would serve
external users at least as much as local researchers.56 Within the NSF, this
national or regional ‘‘user facility’’ model spread in the 1970s from magnetics
research to astronomy to synchrotron-based materials science and biology to
biology more generally and to chemistry.57
54. Dian Belanger, Enabling American Innovation: Engineering and the National Science
Foundation (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1998).
55. Jay Harris, ‘‘It’s a Small World,’’ text of talk delivered at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Cornell Nanofabrication Facility/NRRFSS in 2003, copy given to Cyrus Mody by Jay Harris;
also, Jay H. Harris et al., ‘‘The Government Role in VLSI,’’ in Norman G. Einspruch, ed., VLSI
Electronics: Microstructure Science, vol. 1 (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 265–99.
56. An Assessment of the Needs for Equipment, Instrumentation, and Facilities for University
Research in Science and Engineering (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1971).
57. The Francis Bitter National Magnet Laboratory at MIT (FBNML) was founded in 1961
on an Air Force Office of Scientific Research grant, but was transferred to the NSF in 1971 along
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Thus, the marquee project that Engineering Division leaders sought in 1974
would stretch thin budgets to serve a large, nonlocalized user base, rather than
one that would coordinate a local stable of research projects (as had been the
model with the original IDLs). As Charles Polk, head of the Engineering
Division in 1976–1977, put it:
We have talked about a national center or several regional laboratories where
that major, expensive equipment would be available . . . . [T]he large initial
investment and the continuing support which are required could be justified
only in terms of benefits to many research workers and to many different
institutions. As a consequence, a national or regional laboratory, supported
by NSF, would have to make very good provisions for guest workers and
would have to engage permanent personnel which would help visitors with
physical implementation of their ideas.58
The center model circa 1974 differed from the IDLs circa 1960 in other ways as
well. For instance, where much of the ARPA-IDL grant had paid for Cornell’s
physicists to build Clark Hall, federal funding agencies of the ’70s were less
inclined to pay for bricks and mortar:59 money for a new building to house the
-
with the MRLs. See Arthur Fisher, ‘‘The Magnetism of a Shared Facility,’’ Mosaic 11, no. 2 (1980):
38–45. Jay Harris claims that he had the FBNML in mind when he conceived the idea for
a national microfabrication facility. Jay Harris, interview with author (Mody), San Diego, CA, 5
May 2006. W. Patrick McCray, Giant Telescopes: Astronomical Ambition and the Promise of
Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) describes the fights over con-
struction of publicly funded ‘‘national’’ telescopes in the ’70s and ’80s. Olof Hallonsten, ‘‘Small
Science on Big Machines: Politics and Practices of Synchrotron Radiation Laboratories’’ (PhD
dissertation, Lund University, 2009) offers background on the NSF’s 1973 decision to fund the
Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory as a ‘‘national user facility.’’ That facility was an
outgrowth of Stanford’s Center for Materials Research (one of the MRLs) attached to the AEC-
funded Stanford Linear Accelerator. In 1977, Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology re-
quested funding from the Biological Research Resources Program of NSF’s Division of Envi-
ronmental Biology in order to make the ‘‘Collections [available] as a National Resource.’’
Proposal ‘‘Operational support of the regular collection of mammals in the Museum of Verte-
brate Zoology,’’ W. Z. Lidicker and J. L. Patton, 23 Nov 1977, Museum of Vertebrate Zoology
archives, Berkeley, CA (courtesy of Mary Sunderland). For the adoption of the user facility
concept in chemistry, see William J. Cromie, ‘‘Regional Instrumentation Centers,’’ Mosaic 11,
no. 2 (1980): 12–18.
58. Charles Polk, ‘‘Address to the NSF Workshop,’’ in Report of the NSF Workshop on Needs for
a National Research and Resource Center in Submicron Structures (East Coast), submitted by J. N.
Zemel and M. S. Chang (Philadelphia: Moore School of Electrical Engineering, University of
Pennsylvania, 10 May 1976), 25–35.
59. Defense Science Board Task Force study on ‘‘Defense Requirements and University
Preparedness,’’ 19 Oct 1981, Office of the Director Subject Files, 1964–1983, Records of the NSF,
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NSF Engineering Division’s marquee project would have to come from other
(mostly private) sources.
But what area of engineering should be served by such a facility? As with the
IDLs, a perceived external threat to the United States helped boost a particular
research agenda promoted by a small number of institutional entrepreneurs.
This time, that threat was the rapid increase in Japanese firms’ share of the
microelectronics market and the Japanese government’s announcement of
a crash program in very large-scale integrated circuits (VLSI) in 1975.60 The
VLSI program decisively marked a new era at the NSF, and in American
science policy more generally. Where the paramount goal for federally funded
research in the 1950s and early 1960s had been to contribute to national
defense, and the stated goal in the late 1960s and early 1970s had been to serve
‘‘national needs’’ for the environment, energy, and urban areas, the goals of
American science policy since 1975 have largely been framed by a rhetoric of
‘‘national economic competitiveness.’’61
When a program officer for electrical engineering, Jay Harris, proposed that
the NSF’s Engineering Division sponsor a user facility in an area related to
microelectronics manufacturing, therefore, his supervisors were enthusiastic.
Harris’s concept was a center that would make equipment available for
academic researchers to fabricate microelectronic devices. His own experience
at the University of Washington had taught him that academic researchers
could benefit from using the expensive tools found in industry, but that
-
Record Group 307, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD, Box
USDA to DoE, Folder Department of Defense.
60. For an overview of the VLSI program and its aftermath in Japan, see Scott Callon, Divided
Sun: MITI and the Breakdown of Japanese High-Tech Industrial Policy, 1975–1993 (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1995). We have observed elsewhere that the crises spawned by Sputnik
and the Japanese VLSI program had very similar effects on research fields located at the inter-
section of the physical and engineering sciences. Both crises opened spaces for institutional en-
trepreneurs to grab resources by supplying shaken bureaucracies with visions of revolutionary
research that would fend off the United States’ competitors. The difference, however, is that the
most urgent field of national competition had shifted from defense to commerce between 1957 and
1975. See Hyungsub Choi and Cyrus C. M. Mody, ‘‘The Long History of Molecular Electronics:
Microelectronics Origins of Nanotechnology,’’ Social Studies of Science 39 (2009): 11–50.
61. See Lucena, Defending the Nation (ref. 53) and Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie,
Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1999). We are talking about shifts in emphasis and political attrac-
tiveness here. National security frames never disappeared, of course; indeed, national security
research funding dwarfed non–National Institutes of Health civilian research funding throughout
the period we are discussing. Moreover, national security framing for science policy has seen
periodic resurgences, particularly in the mid-’80s and after 2001.
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industrial colleagues, however helpful, were not able to make that equipment
reliably available: ‘‘In the late ’60s and early ’70s, I used to visit various
industrial laboratories to try to get some help in making small optical struc-
tures. I got my best reception at the Hughes research labs in Malibu, from
a guy named Ed Wolf, who was working with electron beams, but Ed didn’t
really have time to devote to supporting academics trying to work over their
heads.’’62
Professors had to rely on industry in this way because microfabrication
techniques were rapidly evolving in the early 1970s. As Wolf put it, ‘‘a very
noticeable gap opened between university research on the one hand and the
accomplishments of industrial laboratories on the other—a gap due mainly to
the expensive equipment and the interdisciplinary nature of microstructure
science and engineering that universities found difficult, if not impossible, to
support.’’63
Changes in the technology of microfabrication were largely responsible for
that gap. The dominant technique for making commercial microcircuits since
about 1960 has been optical lithography: shining visible light through a ‘‘mask’’
(a specialized stencil or template) onto a ‘‘photoresist’’ (a varnish-like film that
changes chemical composition when exposed to light) coated on a silicon or
silicon dioxide substrate, then ‘‘etching’’ the resist and substrate with acid,
thereby transferring the pattern on the mask into the substrate surface. Crude
photolithography can be done cheaply, but by the early ’70s, various improve-
ments were making state-of-the-art optical lithography prohibitively expensive
for academic researchers. At the same time, even more expensive competitors
to optical photolithography, such as X-ray photolithography and electron and
ion beam lithography, were emerging. The availability of these techniques, and
the professionalization of a microfabrication research community in the early
’70s, ‘‘ignited the ‘lithography wars’—a titanic struggle for supremacy among
a dozen or so competing lithographic technologies, the winner [of] which was
assumed would inherit the mantle of optical lithography in the manufacturing
of integrated circuits.’’64
62. Harris, ‘‘Small World’’ (ref. 55).
63. E. D. Wolf and J. M. Ballantyne, ‘‘Research and Resource at the National Submicron
Facility,’’ in Einspruch, ed., VLSI Electronics (ref. 55), 129–83.
64. Mark L. Schattenburg, ‘‘History of the ‘Three Beams’ Conference, the Birth of the
Information Age, and the Era of Lithography Wars,’’ 2007, http://eipbn.org/2010/wp-content/
uploads/2010/01/EIPBN_history.pdf (accessed 15 Dec 2011).
1 4 4 | MODY AND CHO I
THREE WORKSHOPS AND A COMPETITION
Our point is that the proposal for a microfabrication facility was buoyed by
trends within the NSF and American science policy circles, by the perceived
external threat to the United States from Japanese microelectronics competi-
tion, and by professionalization and technological advances in microfabrica-
tion. The convergence of these trends was enough to win over the NSF
administrators directly above Harris—Gene Chenette, head of the electrical
engineering program; Tom Meloy, head of the Engineering Division; and Ed
Creutz, head of the Math, Physics, and Engineering Directorate. Yet some mem-
bers of the National Science Board (NSF’s governing body) worried that Harris’s
plan for a large block grant to the university hosting the facility would attenuate
the NSF’s oversight of how its money would be spent and undermine the Foun-
dation’s traditional commitment to meritocratic, peer-reviewed awards.65
Some members of the NSB were apparently also concerned that important
external constituencies were unenthusiastic about the proposal. Department of
Defense grant officers, for instance, advised that an academic microfabrication
facility was unnecessary because industry drove innovation in miniaturization
of electronics. Researchers at East Coast corporate powerhouses in microfab-
rication—especially Bell Labs—expressed similar views.66 Robert Noyce from
Intel maintained that an academic microfabrication facility would only be
worthwhile as long as it ‘‘st[u]ck to the idea of working on the general concept
of making small structures’’ while leaving silicon microelectronics research to
firms in Silicon Valley. Harris seems to have been responsive to that argument,
since ‘‘the relationship of submicron techniques to engineering and science
concerns outside of VLSI [i.e., for making things other than silicon ICs] was
emphasized in every presentation to the [NSB].’’67
To assuage its concerns, the NSB asked Harris to provide evidence of
academic and industrial support for his proposal. Thus, Harris organized three
workshops in May, 1975, at the University of Pennsylvania, University of Utah,
and Washington University. Attendees were generally enthusiastic, and
emphasized repeatedly the industrial relevance and economic importance of
65. Harris, ‘‘Small World’’ (ref. 55).
66. Harris, ‘‘Government Role’’ (ref. 55); also, interview with Fabian Pease, conducted by
author (Mody), Palo Alto, CA, 16 Nov 2005; and comment by William Brinkman of Bell Labs in
‘‘Discussion of the Objectives, Program and Organization of the Proposed Center,’’ in Zemel and
Chang, Report of the NSF Workshop (ref. 58), 36–40.
67. Harris, ‘‘Government Role’’ (ref. 55).
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silicon microelectronics as justification for such a center. The Washington
University workshop report, for instance, noted that ‘‘adding to the urgency
of the need for research in the submicron domain is the effort made by our
international competitors to leap-frog the U.S. technology in this field. The
most noteworthy program is the Japanese decision to spend $233 million in the
next four years to develop submicron device research and fabrication capabil-
ities with their industry-university teams.’’68
In October of 1976, the NSB gave final approval to fund a submicron
facility, and by February 1, 1977 eighteen proposals had been submitted, with
Cornell, Berkeley, and Lincoln Lab/MIT dominating the competition.69
Hank Smith, a researcher at Lincoln Lab, led the proposal for a facility ‘‘under
M.I.T. management in Lexington, Massachusetts, adjacent to M.I.T. Lincoln
Laboratory.’’70 Tom Everhart, a professor in Berkeley’s Electrical Engineering
department, led his school’s proposal, with significant input from Ed Wolf at
Hughes. Joe Ballantyne, a professor in the School of Electrical Engineering, led
Cornell’s proposal, with the help of fellow members of the MSC such as Art
Ruoff and Boris Batterman.
The NSF review panel’s reasoning in winnowing down to these three can
only be indirectly inferred. One likely consideration is that these three proposals
were probably the strongest in the X-ray and e-beam lithographies deemed most
likely to overthrow mainstream optical lithography. Certainly, the Cornell team
believed that they and Berkeley’s Everhart were the leaders in academic e-beam
lithography.71 Smith was the acknowledged pioneer of X-ray lithography, as
68. William S. C. Chang, Marcel W. Muller, Fred J. Rosenbaum, and Charles M. Wolfe,
Opportunities and Requirements for a National Center for Research on Submicron Structures (St.
Louis: Laboratory for Applied Electronic Sciences, Washington University, May 3, 1976), 5.
69. Henry Smith indicates that a joint proposal by the University of Colorado and the
National Bureau of Standards also made the short list. See Henry Smith oral history, conducted
by author (Mody), Cambridge, MA, 25 Oct 2005, available from the Chemical Heritage
Foundation, Philadelphia, PA. It is not clear how seriously the NSF review panel took the
Colorado proposal. Certainly, it seems to have largely disappeared from the memories of leading
microfabrication specialists of the era—though that may be mostly due to later events. However,
the Cornell team reported to their Dean of Engineering prior to submitting their proposal the
scuttlebutt that ‘‘if only 1 center, will be on a coast.’’ ‘‘Some reasons why Cornell has a strong
chance to attract such a center,’’ undated but probably summer, 1976, probably from Joe Bal-
lantyne and/or Charles Lee, in CCMR, Box 29, Folder 37.
70. Henry Smith (PI), ‘‘Proposal Submitted to National Science Foundation for National
Research and Resource Facility for Submicron Structures,’’ 1 Jul 1977; copy given to Cyrus Mody
by Henry Smith.
71. CCMR, ‘‘Some reasons why’’ (ref. 69).
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evidenced by participant histories and by the fact that he was asked to give
reviews of the topic at Harris’s Penn workshop and many other microfabrication
conferences.72 The Cornell team, though, felt their X-ray expertise was in the
same league as Smith’s, and a Berkeley faculty member, Andrew Neureuther,
gave the X-ray lithography review at Harris’s Utah workshop.73
Another consideration that likely played into the NSF’s decision was the
level of integration between the proposed facilities and other local centers,
particularly the MRLs. As the Cornell team put it, ‘‘We have the strongest
MRL with excellent supporting facilities (thought to be important at [the
Penn] Workshop)’’ and ‘‘We are one of two universities in the country where
significant research on E-beam lithography has been done. (The other is
Berkeley and they have no MRL).’’74 MIT did have an MRL, but Smith included
little interaction with the Center for Materials Science and Engineering in
his proposal, other than to note that facility users could travel the thirteen miles
from Lincoln Lab to the main campus to use the center’s electron microscopes.
The Cornell team especially played on the MSC’s tradition of interdisci-
plinary collaboration as a model for the microfabrication facility, claiming in
their NRRFSS proposal that ‘‘A very significant feature of this MRL is that it
has provided an atmosphere of cooperation among faculty members in differ-
ent departments [including] electrical engineering, materials science, applied
physics, physics and chemistry.’’75 Even Tom Everhart later told Cornell’s dean of
engineering that ‘‘he perceives a constructive attitude toward interdisciplinary
work at Cornell, while at Berkeley such interaction is more difficult to achieve.’’76
72. H. Smith, ‘‘X-Ray Lithography,’’ in Zemel and Chang, Report of the NSF Workshop (ref.
58), 7–9; Schattenburg, ‘‘History of the ‘Three Beams (ref. 64);’’’ Henry I. Smith and R. Fabian
Pease, ‘‘Reaching for the Bottom: The Evolution of EIPBN,’’ Journal of Vacuum Science and
Technology B 22, no. 6 (2004): 2882–84.
73. CCMR, ‘‘Some reasons why’’ (ref. 69); Andrew R. Neureuther, ‘‘X-Ray Lithography and
Photoresist Technology,’’ in Needs for a National Research and Resource Center in Submicron
Structures: Report on National Science Foundation Workshop Held in Salt Lake City, Utah May
21, 1976, submitted by Richard W. Grow, Robert J. Huber, and Roland W. Ure, Jr. (Salt Lake
City, UT: Microwave Device and Physical Electronics Laboratory, University of Utah, 15 Sep
1976), 30–39.
74. CCMR, ‘‘Some reasons why’’ (ref. 69).
75. Joseph Ballantyne et al., proposal for National Sub-Micron Facility, undated (must be Jan
1977), DOR, Box 39, Folder 14.
76. E.T. Cranch, Dean of the College of Engineering, memorandum for the record, re:
‘‘Telephone discussion with Professor T. Everhart, November 15, 1977,’’ 16 Nov 1977, in DOR,
Box 37, Folder 33. Also, interview with Tom Everhart conducted by David Brock and author
(Mody), Santa Barbara, CA, 3 May 2011.
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Hank Smith’s proposal projected quite a few interdisciplinary applications of
microfabrication, particularly in astronomy, alternative energy (fusion and
solar) research, and biology; but these were only projections, rather than
examples taken from a long institutional history.
The MSC’s track record of collaboration not just among disciplines but
between the Colleges of Engineering and Arts and Sciences must have been
extraordinarily appealing to the NSF review panel since, as one contemporary
proponent of academic microfabrication research put it, ‘‘Microstructure fab-
rication involves an extreme spectrum of disciplines.’’77 The Cornell team also
gestured to the MSC in orienting to the economic rationale for a national
microfabrication facility: ‘‘We have a history of successful collaboration with
industry in our semiconductor work. ([Harris’ Penn] Workshop felt industrial
participation was important.)’’78
Finally, the Cornell team emphasized that the MSC would serve as a seed
organization for a network of campus centers, including the microfabrication
facility, that would share resources and personnel. Especially prominent in the
Cornell proposal were plans to establish a synchrotron user facility that could
supply very bright X-rays as a lithographic beam in microfabrication. At the
time, ‘‘user-dedicated synchrotron radiation facilities’’ were extremely rare:
Stanford, Cornell, and Wisconsin were the only U.S. universities with major
efforts in this area.79 The leader of synchrotron research at Cornell (and, from
1978, director of the NSF-funded Cornell High Energy Synchrotron Source,
CHESS) was Boris Batterman—a long-time member of the MSC and prom-
inently listed in Cornell’s NRRFSS proposal. The Cornell proposal may have
highlighted Batterman’s role to blunt Smith’s advantage in the area of X-ray
77. Robert W. Keyes, proposal for Gordon Research Conference on Chemistry and Physics of
Microstructure Fabrication, 3 Mar 1975, in Gordon Research Conference archives, Chemical
Heritage Foundation, Philadelphia, PA, Series III – Director’s Files, Box 51 (AM Cruickshank
Ma-Mi), Folder Microstructure Fabrication.
78. CCMR, ‘‘Some reasons why’’ (ref. 69).
79. ‘‘Background paper on microelectronics and related microfabrication, microscience, and
engineering,’’ probably compiled by the Office of the Assistant Director for Mathematical and
Physical Sciences, and Engineering (NSF), sent by Assistant Director James Krumhansl to Frank
Press, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 30 Oct 1978, found in the in-
office archives of the Stanford Center for Integrated Systems. The background paper makes clear
that NSF officials saw their main contribution to VLSI and the domestic microelectronics
industry’s competitiveness as a function of the NSF-funded centers and user facilities: those
listed include the MRLs, the three synchrotron facilities, the National Magnet Lab, the Chem-
istry Departmental Instrumentation Program and Regional Instrumentation Facilities, and the
NRRFSS.
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lithography, in that the Cornell team could claim access to much brighter
X-rays than Smith could. Cornell’s proposal certainly pointed to Batterman
and others to indicate that the MSC was successful and well-run enough to
spin off centers such as CHESS and NRRFSS that would use the MSC’s
equipment, personnel, and organizational model.
CREATING AN ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
Whatever the reasons, Cornell slipped past Berkeley and (perhaps more
narrowly) MIT to win the NSF competition, thereby setting off dramatic
changes in the upper echelons of the microfabrication community. Initially,
the decision elicited an incensed reaction from the MIT and Berkeley teams.
Everhart apparently attempted to recruit Smith to Berkeley with the offer that
‘‘You come out here as a faculty member. I’ll raise the money, you do the work.
We’ll set up our own nanofabrication facility and we’ll beat the pants off of
Cornell.’’80 As a counteroffer, the director of Smith’s division at Lincoln Lab
‘‘asked what I was going to do. So I told him that I would like to demonstrate
that the NSF had made a big mistake. He says, ‘Great! Let’s do it.’ Just like
that, they gave me a million dollars.’’81 Lincoln Lab’s ‘‘Submicron Technology
Program . . . was operational by late 1977.’’82 Meanwhile, MIT offered Smith
an adjunct position in order to oversee construction of a Submicron Structures
Laboratory on the main campus. The SSL opened in 1978, even before Cor-
nell’s NRRFSS did. By 1980, Smith had moved into a full-time faculty position
at MIT.
At Cornell, Joe Ballantyne became interim director of the facility while he
recruited a permanent director. The top candidates were: Fabian Pease from
Bell Labs; Ed Wolf from Hughes Research; Tom Everhart, Cornell’s erstwhile
rival at Berkeley; and Truman Blocker from Texas Instruments.83 Wolf was
hired, perhaps because (as Jay Harris’s experience showed) he was used to
dealing with outside users while at Hughes. Everhart, however, made enough
80. Smith oral history (ref. 69).
81. Ibid.
82. See ‘‘Materials Research: Meeting the Challenge of Microelectronics Technology,’’ and
‘‘Faculty Profile: Henry I. Smith,’’ RLE Currents 2, no. 1 (1988): 1–8 and 9–14; also Smith oral
history (ref. 69).
83. EE Faculty Meeting minutes, 3 Oct 1977, forwarded to Dean E. Cranch, in DOR, Box 37,
Folder 33.
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of an impression that he was offered the position of Dean of Cornell’s College
of Engineering instead! Since the NRRFSS director reported to the Dean of
Engineering, Everhart ended up advising, supervising, and aiding Wolf
considerably.
Stanford, which already had an Integrated Circuits Laboratory (ICL) that
exceeded anything at Cornell, Berkeley, or MIT, had not submitted a proposal
for Harris’s facility, largely because the ICL’s director, James Meindl, did not
see NSF funding as sufficiently substantial or stable.84 The Cornell award,
however, stimulated Meindl’s plans to build a ‘‘Center for Integrated Systems’’
(CIS) incorporating a much-expanded ICL designed to outshine the NRRFSS.
The rivalry between Stanford and Cornell was mitigated, however, by Meindl’s
presence on the NRRFSS advisory board. Other Silicon Valley luminaries,
such as Gordon Moore, also served on the NRRFSS board at various times,
perhaps with the aim of balancing the influence of East Coast firms such as
IBM and Bell Labs.
Over the medium term, the competition for a national submicron facility
led to organizational innovations at MIT, Stanford, and Cornell that were then
replicated independently and (at first) rather haphazardly across many sites.
What sociologists would call an ‘‘organizational field’’ of microfabrication
began to emerge, in much the same way that the MRLs had fostered an
organizational field for materials science.85
The University of Minnesota, Rensselaer Polytechnic, Arizona State,
Caltech, the University of Arkansas, Auburn, and university consortia in
North Carolina and Texas all founded or dramatically expanded their micro-
fabrication facilities between 1978 and 1984.86
84. Interview with James Meindl conducted by Cyrus Mody, Atlanta, GA, 30 Mar 2010.
85. Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Iso-
morphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,’’ American Sociological Review 48
(1983): 147–60.
86. Gregory T. Cibuzar, ‘‘Microelectronics at the University of Minnesota,’’ Proceedings of the
Tenth Annual University/Government/Industry Microelectronics Symposium (IEEE: 1993), 170–73.
Jerry R. Yeargan, ‘‘Developing a Program in Analog Electronics,’’ Proceedings of the Sixth Annual
University/Government/Industry Microelectronics Symposium (IEEE: 1993), 9–11. R. C. Jaeger et al.,
‘‘The Alabama Microelectronics Science and Technology Center and the Microelectronics
Program at Auburn University,’’ Proceedings of the Sixth Annual University/Government/Industry
Microelectronics Symposium (IEEE: 1993), 42–45. Other papers in the IEEE University/Govern-
ment/Industry proceedings for the early ’80s give a sense of the growth of the microfabrication
organizational field. See also John F. Mason, ‘‘VLSI Goes to School,’’ IEEE Spectrum 17, no. 11
(1980): 48–52. Dale Whittington, High Hopes for High Tech: Microelectronics Policy in North
Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).
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As this organizational field grew, each site continually looked to the others
for models of how to work with industry, set charges for equipment use, foster
interdisciplinary collaboration, and so on. The proposal for Texas’s Microelec-
tronics Research Center in 1983, for instance, offered comparison data for the
Cornell, Stanford, MIT, North Carolina, Arizona State, and Minnesota facil-
ities (listed in that order).87 The Cornell, MIT, and Stanford facilities, in
particular, provided not just access to tools, but also access to knowledge of
how to establish and operate an organization like NRRFSS. That knowledge
then fostered the propagation of the microfabrication organizational field
through industry and academia, and helped maintain ties among the organiza-
tions in that field. As Joe Ballantyne reported in 1986, ‘‘NRRFSS is continually
called on to help/advise other companies and universities in setting up similar
laboratories . . . . Over the last several years we have advised more than forty
organizations.’’88
The growth of an academic microfabrication organizational field may or
may not have been one of the NSF’s goals when it held the NRRFSS
competition. Unlike ARPA in 1960–1961, the NSF in 1975–1976 could afford
to support just one facility rather than a dozen. But when the opportunity
presented itself, the NSF was quick to stimulate diffusion of the microfabrica-
tion user facility form. For instance, in 1978 the Assistant Director for
Mathematical and Physical Sciences and Engineering, James Krumhansl,
established a Microstructures Science, Engineering, and Technology
(or mSET) program that widely touted the Cornell (and, to a lesser extent,
MIT and Stanford) facilities and provided small grants to schools starting their
own microfabrication facilities.89 The NSF also encouraged Cornell to aid
other schools with nascent facilities. According to the NRRFSS policy board,
‘‘A strong recommendation came out of the site review team that the facility
host a meeting of microelectronics-related center directors to encourage
collaborations and technology transfer. The NSF . . . has endorsed this concept
87. Ben Streetman et al., ‘‘Proposal for a Texas Microelectronics Center in the College of
Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin,’’ Mar 1983, in University of Texas Executive Vice
President and Provost’s Office records (collection 96-273), The Center for American History,
University of Texas at Austin, Box 24, Folder Microelectronics Research Center, 1983–1984.
88. Joe Ballantyne, memo to Greg Galvin, re: Information for Frank Rhodes [president of
Cornell], 11 Aug 1986, FRP, Box 160, Folder 59.
89. See, for example, the special issue of Physics Today on ‘‘microscience’’ that Krumhansl
instigated, including Edward D. Wolf, ‘‘The National Submicron Facility,’’ Physics Today 32, no.
11 (1979).
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and will both request the facility to do so and will provide funding for such
a meeting.’’90
Of course, sometimes facilities had to obtain information about their peer
organizations through backchannels: for example, by phoning industry leaders
to ask how their companies had been approached by rival academic facilities, or
by surreptitiously obtaining prospectuses for competitors’ industrial programs
and policy memos describing competing schools’ intellectual property
policies.91 The leading microfabrication facilities also broadcast information
about their organizational model through public channels. For instance, by
1982 the NRRFSS had appeared in some ‘‘22 magazines and 43 newspapers,’’ as
well as televised segments on the BBC and CBS.92 Congress, too, took an
interest. In 1979 Ed Wolf testified before a House Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Technology hearing on ‘‘Government and Innovation:
University-Industry Relations.’’ Five years later, Cornell’s president, Frank
Rhodes, was also called before the House, where he used both the MSC and
the National Submicron Facility (as the NRRFSS came to be known) as
examples of how to overcome the problem of access to increasingly expensive
instrumentation.93
Yet the Submicron Facility’s actual relations with industry and provision of
access to non-Cornell users were halting at first. As Everhart noted in 1981,
there was at that point ‘‘considerable difference between the expectations of the
scientific community of the Submicron Facility and what was proposed to the
National Science Foundation by Cornell.’’94 In large part, the first five years of
the facility were taken up with hiring faculty and staff, forming committees,
and experimenting with administrative procedures (such as deciding what
90. NRRFSS Policy Board, ‘‘Background Material for Topics to Be Discussed,’’ 17 Nov 1986,
DOR, Box 39, Folder 13.
91. For instance, one of us (Mody) found several such items in the in-house archive of the
Stanford Center for Integrated Systems, including: an MIT patent policy draft from May 1982,
with handwritten note indicating it came ‘‘from SRC [Semiconductor Research Corporation]
file’’ of John Linvill, director of CIS, and attached to a memo from Jim Gibbons to CIS Executive
Committee, 29 Oct 1982; and a May 1989 prospectus for Hank Smith’s MIT Microsystems
Technology Laboratories’ Microsystems Industrial Group program.
92. NRRFSS, ‘‘Report on the National User Research Program ’82–’85,’’ in DOR, Box 38,
Folder 5; also E.D. Wolf, ‘‘Recent National Press Coverage of NRRFSS,’’ handout for NSF
discussions, 7 Jan 1982, DOR, Box 37, Folder 32.
93. ‘‘Improving the Research Infrastructure at U.S. Universities and Colleges,’’ Hearing before
the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, 98th Congress,
Second Session, 8 May 1984.
94. T.E. Everhart, memo to NRRFSS Policy Board, 25 Feb 1981, DOR, Box 39, Folder 12.
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equipment to buy, what to charge Cornell and non-Cornell users for time on
that equipment, and how to make decisions about what to buy and charge).
The facility’s first five years were also spent raising the $3.4 million for
a state-of-the-art building. This was necessary because microfabrication had
become so sophisticated that cutting-edge techniques could only achieve their
full capabilities if housed in a new building with special shielding from vibra-
tion and electromagnetic interference.95 Yet the NSF, unlike ARPA in the
early ’60s, was unwilling to put money into bricks and mortar. Funds for the
building came from private philanthropies, especially the Pew Charitable Trust,
and from an alumnus, Lester Knight, for whom the building was named. By 1985
Wolf and his team could report that the Knight Laboratory ‘‘has been used as
a model by many educational institutions, government labs, and companies in the
construction of research facilities for high-resolution fabrication.’’96
The preoccupations of building administrative and concrete structures
meant that at the end of its first five-year grant the National Submicron
Facility was not yet a ‘‘national’’ resource. Indeed, the National Science Board
made its authorization for renewal of the facility’s grant dependent on sub-
mission of more detailed reports on (and greater commitment to) the Submi-
cron Facility’s user program.97 Accordingly, the facility hired more full-time
staff to help users and named a younger faculty member, Robert Buhrman,
Associate Director for the User Program.98 Under Buhrman’s leadership, the
user program quickly took off, until by 1986 ‘‘over 60% of the normal 40 hour
work week at the facility was utilized by non-Cornell user research projects.’’99
95. ‘‘A New Home for the Facility,’’ PROSUS (Program on Submicrometer Structures)
newsletter, Spring 1980, DOR, Box 32, Folder 19.
96. [Author unknown], ‘‘The Role of NRRFSS’’ [‘‘a report prepared for Cornell University
President Frank H.T. Rhodes describing the past accomplishments of NRRFSS’’], DOR, Box 39,
Folder 16.
97. Ronald Gutman [NSF Program Director for Solid State and Microstructures Engineer-
ing] to Ed Wolf, Jul 1982, DOR, Box 39, Folder 15.
98. NRRFSS, ‘‘Report on User Program’’ (ref. 92).
99. E. D. Wolf et al., ‘‘Proposal for National Nanofabrication Facility at Cornell University,’’
Aug 1986, DOR, Box 39, Folder 15. It should be noted, however, that the next sentence of the
proposal states that ‘‘the resources of the NRRFSS are available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to
trained users.’’ It’s likely, therefore, that the 60% figure overstates the proportion of non-Cornell
users. Non-Cornell visitors would depend on assistance from facility personnel—present during
normal working hours—for a much greater proportion of their time in Ithaca than Cornell users.
Thus, Cornell graduate students would probably have found it much easier to use the facility’s
equipment during off-hours, and therefore likely took up much more than 40% of total user
time.
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Most of those nonlocal users were from other universities, but by 1985 12%
of users came from industry and 7% from government labs.100 By 1986, the
facility had enrolled some thirty-seven companies in its industrial affiliates
program. These companies paid, at least at the beginning of the program,
a mere $8500 per year— compared to the Stanford CIS’s industrial sponsors,
each of which put in $250,000 per year for three years, followed by $120,000
annually after that.101 That difference is presumably an indication of
Ithaca’s geographic and social distance from the center of the American
FIG. 3. Cornell’s Engineering Quad, circa 1984. The Knight Laboratory, specially constructed
for the National Submicron Facility, is the building with the Greek mu (for mm or micrometer)
painted on its roof. The Knight Laboratory was attached to Phillips Hall, home of the School of
Electrical Engineering; Phillips Hall is seen toward the bottom of the map in Figure 2. Source:
Gladys McConkey and Hillary Retzig, eds., Submicron Research: Investigations at Cornell
University in the National Submicron Facility (Ithaca, NY: College of Engineering, Cornell
University, 1984).
100. NRRFSS, ‘‘Report on User Program’’ (ref. 92).
101. Cornell University News Bureau news release, ‘‘Background: Visiting Scientists,
Industrial Affiliates Participate in National Research and Resource Facility for Submicron
Structures,’’ Oct 1981, DOR, Box 37, Folder 32; Stanford Center for Integrated Systems Industrial
Sponsors Advisory Committee draft report, 16 Sep 1988, CIS in-house archive. Note, though, that
there were less than half as many CIS sponsors, and that only a fraction of CIS sponsorship funds
went to the Integrated Circuits Laboratory.
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microelectronics industry. Yet despite that distance, the facility built up a thick
web of industrial ties. In 1986, Joe Ballantyne could report that ‘‘No one has yet
told me that another school does a better job of industrial interactions than
Cornell. We have active collaborative research with industry directly in the
facility (e.g. AT&T Bell Laboratories, McDonnell Douglas and General
Electric) and the largest source of support for the projects utilizing NRRFSS
is industrial grants/contracts.’’102
CENTERS ASCENDANT
Whether or not the MSC and NRRFSS paid their hoped-for dividends to the
nation, by 1985 they were clearly benefiting Cornell’s ability to acquire further
interdisciplinary centers. As Roger Segelken, a Cornell public relations officer,
put it that year in describing how the school won NSF funding for its Theory
Center (a supercomputing facility):
We prepared a background piece saying that ‘‘Cornell University is
a promising location for a national, advanced scientific computing center
because of its experience in operating highly successful interdisciplinary
centers for the benefit of the scientific research community.’’ And we took
the opportunity to brag about the Cornell Manufacturing Engineering and
Productivity Program (COMEPP) and the Cornell High Energy Synchro-
tron Source (CHESS) and the Materials Science Center and the National
Research and Resource Facility for Submicron Structures (which spells
NRRFSS) and the Cornell Biotechnology Institute and the Semiconductor
Research Corporation Center of Excellence in Microscience and
Technology.103
Indeed, in the mid-80s, the proliferation of Cornell centers led to ‘‘growing
concern at NSF, which may underlie [NSF Director] Erich Bloch’s longstand-
ing complaint about the Submicron Facility, that too much NSF money is
going to New York State and particularly to Cornell.’’104
102. Ballantyne memo to Galvin (ref. 88).
103. Roger Segelken, ‘‘A Case History of a Computer Media Event—Introducing a Super-
computer Center,’’ Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Systems Documentation
(New York: ACM, 1985), 146–60.
104. John F. Burness, Vice President for University Relations, to Frank Rhodes, President of
Cornell, 10 Sep 1986, FRP, Box 160, Folder 59.
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Yet if Cornell’s success in securing funding for a growing, interconnected
roster of interdisciplinary centers was one reason for Bloch’s opposition to the
Submicron Facility, those centers were also widely recognized as critical to
Bloch’s own achievements as NSF director. Bloch was installed at the NSF
largely to carry out the Reagan administration’s agenda of gearing American
academic research more closely to the needs of high-tech industry. The vehicle
for that vision that Bloch pushed through in 1984 was the Engineering
Research Centers program—originally a suite of six academic facilities (cur-
rently thirteen, plus twenty-nine ‘‘graduated’’ ERCs) that, as Dian Belanger
puts it, ‘‘addressed immediate concerns in both engineering research and
engineering education—concerns articulated by both academe and
industry.’’105
In Belanger’s view, the ERCs ‘‘represented a fundamental rethinking of
traditional NSF engineering activity.’’ Over time, they came to be viewed as
such a successful program that they spawned cascades of new center programs
at the NSF: e.g., the Science and Technology Centers and the Centers for
Research Excellence in Science and Technology programs in 1987, the Materi-
als Research Science and Engineering Centers (a revamped version of the
MRLs) in 1994, and several smaller current center programs (e.g., Centers for
Analysis and Synthesis; Centers for Chemical Innovation; Science of Learning
Centers)—not to mention other interdisciplinary centers that were not part of
any larger center program. Interdisciplinary centers—and especially programs
spawning peer groups of centers—have become an almost instinctive mode of
funding at the NSF, and of doing business on American campuses.
Bloch and the NSF owed much to the MSC and NRRFSS in establishing
that orthodoxy. As the industrial members of the NRRFSS’s Policy Board put
it in 1986, ‘‘The National Science Foundation’s investment in the Submicron
Facility has enabled it to serve as a model for scientific and engineering centers
nationally.’’106 Later that year, the head of the NSF’s Engineering Directorate
acknowledged that ‘‘The model of NRRFSS as a user facility role has been
utilized in the planning and establishment of NSF’s Regional Instrumental
Laboratory program. More recently, the interdisciplinary operation of
NRRFSS has provided the feasibility model for the innovative ERC
105. Belanger, Enabling American Innovation (ref. 54), 219.
106. Letter from the corporate members of the NRRFSS Policy Board (from Intel, IBM,
Motorola, Bell Labs, and GE) to Nam Suh, NSF Assistant Director for Engineering, 16 Oct 1986,
FRP, Box 160, Folder 59.
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program.’’107 As Joe Ballantyne put it, looking back from 1999, these national
programs showed that ‘‘the old MSC philosophy came to pervade Cornell and
the nation.’’108
Cornell and the NRRFSS were, in turn, deeply affected by the entrench-
ment of the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support’’ in ways that facilitated the emergence
of nanotechnology as a national science policy priority. In the mid-1980s, the
NRRFSS’s leaders desperately sought a new mission for their facility, since
NSF awards last, at maximum, ten years. In 1984, they submitted a proposal to
turn the facility into one of the first ERCs, but were bluntly turned down.
Pressured by the facility’s industrial partners, however, the NSF the next year
agreed to fund Cornell’s proposal for what it now called the ‘‘National Nano-
fabrication Facility’’ (NNF).
By the early 1990s, the NNF was again approaching the end of its award,
with Stanford and MIT’s peer facilities vying to take away Cornell’s ‘‘national’’
status. This time, the head of NSF’s Directorate for Engineering, Joe Bordogna,
decided that the time had come for greater coordination within the organiza-
tional field that had spawned around the MIT, Stanford, and Cornell
facilities.109 Thus, the NSF announced a competition not for a single facility,
but for a ‘‘National Nanofabrication Users Network’’ (NNUN). Initially,
Cornell and MIT joined forces for the competition; but then, probably after
some signaling from the NSF, Cornell and Stanford agreed to co-lead a five-
member consortium. A decade later the NNUN again hit the ten-year limit
and therefore revamped and expanded as the fourteen-member National
Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network, with Cornell again the lead facility
and Stanford the co-leader.
In adopting the ‘‘nano’’ prefix, the NNF and NNUN lent weight to the
arguments of federal grant officers promoting the creation of a National Nano-
technology Initiative. Conversely, by making available the tools of nanoscale
research, the NNUN sites boosted their universities’ faculty members’ chances
of securing NSECs and other interdisciplinary nano centers once the NNI was
founded. Twelve of the fourteen NNIN campuses also have a MRSEC and/or
107. Nam Suh, NSF Assistant Director for Engineering, to National Science Board Com-
mittee on Programs and Plans, about 16 Oct 1986, re: Report on User Research at the National
Research and Resource Facility for Submicron Structures, FRP, Box 160, Folder 59.
108. Ballantyne,‘‘Centers: Collaboration, Coordination, Competition, Collegiality, Cost, and
Continuity,’’ draft for talk at symposium in honor of Dale Corson, given to Hyungsub Choi by
Ballantyne.
109. Joe Bordogna, interview with author (Mody), Philadelphia, PA, 1 May 2007.
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at least one other nano center (as categorized by the NNI). Five schools
(including Cornell and Stanford) have an NNIN site, a MRSEC, plus two
other NNI-defined nano centers.
CONCLUSION: GENERALIZABILITY IN HISTORY AND
SCIENCE POLICY
Our story has taken us across a half-century in time, during which successive
cascades of federal centers programs have spread peer groups of interdisciplin-
ary academic centers into every corner of the United States.110 Over that
half-century, the interdisciplinary academic research center concept has been
both durable and continually evolving. It took many years for universities and
funding agencies to learn how to build and operate such centers. Those grow-
ing pains are evident in the MSC’s struggles to become ‘‘relevant’’ to ARPA
and NSF’s priorities and in satisfying those agencies’ definitions of interdisci-
plinarity, and in the NRRFSS’s steep learning curve in developing an external
user community.
Moreover, the problems that this organizational form has been used to solve
have changed, sometimes rapidly and dramatically, since the IDL program was
created after Sputnik. Successive perceived national crises have jolted academic
centers and their federal funders from one goal to another: defeating commu-
nism, solving ‘‘human problems,’’ maintaining national economic competi-
tiveness, providing a peace dividend, defending the homeland, increasing
diversity in the technical workforce, and so on. Through it all, though, the
center form has maintained some continuity. The MSC still exists (though
now as the Cornell Center for Materials Research), as does Clark Hall. The
Knight Laboratory is gone, but only because it created the need for a much
larger nanofabrication building, Duffield Hall, on the same spot. Similarly, the
110. The MRSECs and NNI-defined nano centers are located in thirty states and the District
of Columbia. While our story is primarily about U.S. universities and federal agencies, the
communities of researchers interacting with those institutions were transnational in scope. For
a similar survey of the spread of an organizational field for materials science in France, see Pierre
Teissier, ‘‘Solid-State Chemistry in France: Structures and Dynamics of a Scientific Community
since World War II,’’ HSNS 40, no. 2 (2010): 225–58. Similarly, the Korea Science and Engi-
neering Foundation (KOSEF) also began its Science and Engineering Research Centers (SRC/
ERC) program in 1989. KOSEF ed., Han’gukkwahakchaedanŭi palchach’wiwa saeroun toyak:
Han’gukkwahakchaedan 20yŏnsa [Trajectory and New Leap Forward of KOSEF: A 20-year History
of KOSEF] (Daejeon, Korea: KOSEF, 1997) (in Korean).
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NRRFSS has disappeared, but its direct descendant, the Cornell NanoScale
Science & Technology Facility, now leads the NNIN.
So the stability and decentralization of the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support’’ allow
organizations such as the MSC and NRRFSS to nimbly adapt to new circum-
stances. No wonder, then, that the center form is so popular with both
universities and their federal funders. No wonder, too, that the center form
was so instrumental in a few leading universities’ adaptation to the early Cold
War science policy regime. As we acknowledged in our introduction, one-off
interdisciplinary academic research centers have existed for a long time. There is
a deep literature on the role of such one-off centers in the emergence of a postwar
military-industrial-academic complex, particularly at MIT and Stanford. From
this literature, historians have learned a great deal about what other universities
strove to look like as they adapted (more slowly) to postwar circumstances.
Yet much more has been written about the export of MIT and Stanford’s
organizational innovations into industry and to America’s current and poten-
tial allies than about the spread of MIT and Stanford’s interdisciplinary centers
to other U.S. universities.111 For the post-Sputnik period, this article has
described an important mechanism (federally funded interdisciplinary research
centers programs) that stimulated multi-site adoption of centers in fields
(materials science, microfabrication, and nanotechnology) where MIT and
Stanford have indeed been important players. However, we have demonstrated
that the ‘‘‘centers’ mode of support’’ also allowed other schools, such as
Cornell, to act as the primus inter pares within their centers’ peer groups.
Cornell’s role in the propagation of the center concept has taken many
forms. It has competed for (and usually won) awards in many successive federal
centers programs. Locally, its established centers have repeatedly spun off new
centers, while nationally its centers have been important models for federal
agencies starting (and other universities joining) new center programs.
111. Stuart W. Leslie and Robert H. Kargon, ‘‘Selling Silicon Valley: Frederick Terman’s
Model for Regional Advantage,’’ Business History Review 70 (1996): 435–72; Dong-Won Kim and
Stuart W. Leslie, ‘‘Winning Markets or Winning Nobel Prizes? KAIST and the Challenges of
Late Industrialization,’’ Osiris, 2nd series, 13 (1998): 154–85; Stuart W. Leslie, ‘‘Regional Disad-
vantage: Replicating Silicon Valley in New York’s Capital Region,’’ Technology and Culture 42,
no. 2 (2001): 236–64; Stuart W. Leslie and Robert Kargon, ‘‘Exporting MIT: Science, Technol-
ogy, and Nation-Building in India and Iran,’’ Osiris 21 (2006): 110–30; Ross Bassett, ‘‘Aligning
India in the Cold War Era: Indian Technical Elites, the Indian Institute of Technology at
Kanpur, and Computing in India and the United,’’ Technology and Culture 50, no. 4 (2009):
783–810; Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next
Silicon Valley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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Graduates of its centers have founded or joined similar centers at many other
schools. Leaders of its centers (such as Robert Sproull, James Krumhansl, and Ed
Wolf) have joined federal agencies or national committees where they have over-
seen their centers’ peer groups or guided the formation of new center programs.
Cornell is hardly unique in cultivating all of these inter- and intra-university
ties among centers. We believe, however, that the web of ties from Cornell’s
federally supported centers to other centers is thick enough that the Cornell
case can provide general insights into the changing role of U.S. universities
since Sputnik. Our examination of Cornell’s centers has particularly high-
lighted two significant transitions in the academic sector of national science
policy. The first entailed the sudden civilianization of large portions of feder-
ally funded university research around 1970, and enhanced status for civilian
agencies such as NSF and NIH going forward. The second, which accelerated
in earnest in 1975, increasingly shifted universities’ focus toward the market
and fostered a wide variety of new forms of university-industry partnership. As
we have tried to show, both these transitions were viewed as significant
departures at the time, and both occasioned much anxiety and hasty impro-
visation at Cornell and elsewhere.
Yet neither of these transitions should be seen as an ‘‘epochal break’’ in
which past practices were disowned.112 In both cases, the high Cold War
provided explicit precedents that made the transition easier. Both ARPA and
NSF, for instance, used the language of ‘‘relevance’’ in pushing the MSC to
pursue a more problem-oriented form of interdisciplinarity. Similarly, Cor-
nell’s NRRFSS proposal touted the MSC’s high Cold War, ARPA-guided
coupling with industry in making the case that Cornell could aid American
semiconductor firms in the post-VLSI era. If the Cornell case is at all gener-
alizable, it may indeed be true that today’s academic research is ‘‘postmodern’’
in its orientation to technological and commercial applications; but if so, it is
only because American universities have been postmodern for a very long time.
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